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Abstract. We present a formal verification of the functional correct-
ness of the Muen Separation Kernel. Muen is representative of the class of
modern separation kernels that leverage hardware virtualization support,
and are generative in nature in that they generate a specialized kernel
for each system configuration. These features pose substantial challenges
to existing verification techniques. We propose a verification framework
called conditional parametric refinement which allows us to formally
reason about generative systems. We use this framework to carry out
a conditional refinement-based proof of correctness of the Muen kernel
generator. Our analysis of several system configurations shows that our
technique is effective in producing mechanized proofs of correctness, and
also in identifying issues that may compromise the separation property.
Keywords: Separation kernels · Verification · Security.
1 Introduction
A separation kernel (SK) is a small specialized operating system or microkernel,
that provides a sand-boxed or “separate” execution environment for a given set
of processes (also called “partitions” or “subjects”). The subjects may commu-
nicate only via declared memory channels, and are otherwise isolated from each
other. Unlike a general operating system these kernels usually have a fixed set
of subjects to run according to a specific schedule on the different CPUs of a
processor-based system.
The idea of a separation kernel was proposed by Rushby [31] as a way of
breaking down the process of reasoning about the overall security of a com-
puter system. The overall security of a system, in his view, derives from (a) the
physical separation of its components, and (b) the specific security properties
of its individual components or subjects. A separation kernel thus focuses on
providing the separation property (a) above. Separation kernels have since been
embraced extensively in military and aerospace domains, for building security
and safety-critical applications.
Our focus in this paper is in formally verifying that a separation kernel does
indeed provide the separation property, and more generally that it functions cor-
rectly (which would include for example, that it executes subjects according to a
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specified schedule). One way of obtaining a high level of assurance in the correct
functioning of a system is to carry out a refinement-based proof of functional
correctness [17,18], as has been done in the context of OS verification [31,22].
Here one specifies an abstract model of the system’s behaviour, and then shows
that the system implementation conforms to the abstract specification. A re-
finement proof typically subsumes all the standard security properties related to
separation, like no-exfiltration/infiltration and temporal and spatial separation
of subjects considered for instance in [15].
Our specific aim in this paper is to formally verify the correctness of the
Muen separation kernel [6], which is an open-source representative of a class of
modern separation kernels (including several commercial products like Green-
Hills Integrity Multivisor [13], LynxSecure [25], PikeOS [34], VxWorks MILS
platform [36], and XtratuM [27]) that use hardware virtualization support and
are generative in nature. By the latter we mean that these tools take an input
specification describing the subjects and the schedule of execution, and generate
a tailor-made processor-based system that includes subject binaries, page tables,
and a kernel that acts like a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM).
When we took up this verification task over three years ago, a few challenges
stood out. How does one reason about a system whose kernel makes use of
virtualization features in the underlying hardware in addition to Assembly and
a high-level language like Ada? Secondly, how does one reason about a complex
4-level paging structure and the translation function it induces? Finally, and
most importantly, how do we reason about a generative system to show that
for every possible input specification, it produces a correct artifact? A possible
approach for the latter would be to verify the generator code, along the lines of
the CompCert project [24]. However with the generator code running close to
41K LOC, with little or no compositional structure, and not being designed for
verification, this would be a formidable task. One could alternatively perform
translation validation [30] of an input specification of interest, but this would
require manual effort from scratch each time.
We overcame the first challenge of virtualization by simply choosing to model
the virtualization layer (in this case Intel’s VT-x layer) along with the rest of the
hardware components like registers and memory, programmatically in software.
Thus we modeled VT-x components like the per-CPU VMX-Timer and EPTP
as 64-bit variables in Ada, and implicit structures like the VMCS as a record
with appropriate fields as specified by Intel [19]. Instructions like VMLAUNCH
were then implemented as methods that accessed these variables. As it turned
out, virtualization was more of a boon than a bane, as it simplifies the kernel’s
(and hence the prover’s) job of preemption and context-switching.
We solved the third problem of generativeness (and coincidentally the second
problem of page tables too), by leveraging a key feature of such systems: the
kernel is essentially a template which is largely fixed, independent of the input
specification. The kernel accesses variables which represent input-specific details
like subject details and the schedule, and these structures are generated by
Muen based on the given input specification. The kernel can thus be viewed
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as a parametric program, much like a method that computes using its formal
parameter variables. In fact, taking a step back, the whole processor system
generated by Muen can be viewed as a parametric program with parameter
values like the schedule, subject details, page tables, and memory elements being
filled in by the generator based on the input specification.
This view suggests a novel two-step technique for verifying generative sys-
tems that can be represented as parametric programs. We call this approach
conditional parametric refinement. We first perform a general verification step
(independent of the input spec) to verify that the parametric program refines
a parametric abstract specification, assuming certain natural conditions on the
parameter values (for example injectivity of the page tables) that are to be filled
in. This first step essentially tells us that for any input specification P , if the
parameters generated by the system generator satisfy the assumed conditions,
then the generated system is correct vis-a-vis the abstract specification. In the
second step, which is input-specific, we check that for a given input specifica-
tion, the assumptions actually hold for the generated parameter values. This
gives us an effective verification technique for verifying generative systems that
lies somewhere between verifying the generator and translation validation.
We carried out the first step of this proof technique for Muen, using the
Spark Ada [2] verification environment. The effort involved about 20K lines of
source code and annotation. No major issues were found, modulo some subjec-
tive assumptions we discuss in Sec. 12. We have also implemented a tool that
automatically and efficiently performs the Step 2 check for a given SK configura-
tion. The tool is effective in proving the assumptions, leading to machine-checked
proofs of correctness for 12 different input configurations, as well as in detect-
ing issues like undeclared sharing of memory components in some seeded faulty
configurations.
To summarize our contributions, we have proposed a novel approach based
on parametric refinement for verifying generative systems. We have applied this
technique to verify the Muen separation kernel, which is a complex low-level
software system that makes use of hardware virtualization features. We believe
that other verification efforts for similar generative systems can benefit from
our approach. To the best of our knowledge our verification of Muen is the first
work that models and reasons about Intel’s VT-x virtualization features in the
context of separation kernels. Finally, we note that our verification of Muen is
a post-facto effort, in that we verify an existing system which was not designed
and developed hand-in-hand with the verification process.
2 Conditional Parametric Refinement
We begin by introducing the flavour of classical refinement that we will make
use of, followed by the parametric refinement framework we employ for our
verification task.
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2.1 Machines and Refinement
A convenient way to reason about systems such as Muen is to view them as
an Abstract Data Type or simply machine to use the Event-B terminology [1].
A machine type N = (N, {In}n∈N , {On}n∈N ) contains a finite set of named
operations N , with each operation n ∈ N having an associated input domain In
and output domain On. Each machine type contains a designated initialization
operation called init . A machine A of type N above is a structure of the form
(Q, {opn}n∈N ), where Q is a set of states, and for each n ∈ N , opn : (Q× In)→
(Q×On) is the implementation of operation n. If opn(p, a) = (q, b), then when
opn is invoked with input a in a state p of the machine, it returns b and changes
the state to q. The init operation is assumed to be independent of the state in
which it is invoked as well as the input passed to it. Hence we simply write init()
instead of init(p, a) etc.
The machine A induces a transition system TA in a natural way, whose states
are the states Q of A, and transitions from one state to another are labelled
by triples of the form (n, a, b), representing that operation n with input a was
invoked and the return value was b. One is interested in the language of initialized
sequences of operation calls produced by this transition system, which models
behaviours of the system, and we call it Linit(A).
We will consider different ways of representing machines, the most important
of which is as a program in a high-level imperative programming language. The
global variables of the program (more precisely valuations for them) make up the
state of the machine. The implementation of an operation n is given by a method
definition of the same name, that takes an argument a in In, updates the global
state, and returns a value b in On. We call such a program a machine program.
Fig 1(a) shows a program in a C-like language, that represents a “set” machine
with operations init , add and elem. The set stores a subset of the numbers 0–3,
in a Boolean array of size 4. However, for certain extraneous reasons, it uses an
array T to permute the positions where information for an element x is stored.
Thus to indicate that x is present in the set the bit S[T [x]] is set to true. We
use the notation “0..3” to denote range of integers from 0 to 3 inclusive.
Another representation of a machine could be in the form of a processor-based
system. Here the state is given by the values of the processor’s registers and the
contents of the memory. The operations (like “execute the next instruction on
CPU0”, or “timer event on CPU1”) are defined by either the processor hardware
(as in the former operation) or by software in the form of an interrupt handler
(as in the latter operation).
Refinement [17,18,1] is a way of saying that a “concrete” machine conforms
to an “abstract” one, behaviourally. In our setting of total and deterministic
machines, refinement boils down to containment of sequential behaviours. Let
A = (Q, {opn}n∈N ) and A′ = (Q′, {op′n}n∈N ) be two machines of type N . We
say A′ refines A if Linit(A′) ⊆ Linit(A). One usually makes use of a “gluing”
relation to exhibit refinement. A gluing relation on the states of A′ and A above
is a relation ρ ⊆ Q′ ×Q. We say ρ is adequate (to show that A′ refines A) if it
satisfies the following conditions:
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typedef univ 0..3;
bool S[4];
univ T[4] := {1,2,3,0};
void init() {
for (int i:=0; i<4; i++)
S[i] := false;
}
void add(univ x) {
S[T[x]] := true;
}
bool elem(univ x) {
return S[T[x]];
}
// Abstract spec
typedef univ 0..3;
bool absS[4];
void add(univ x) {
absS[x] := true;
}
...
// Gluing relation
\forall univ x:
S[T[x]] = absS[x]
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) A machine program P implementing a set machine and (b) an abstract
specification A and gluing relation.
const unsigned Usize;
typedef univ 0..Usize-1;
bool S[Usize];
univ T[Usize];
void init() {
for (int i:=0; i<Usize; i++)
S[i] := false;
}
void add(univ x) {
S[T[x]] := true;
}
bool elem(univ x) {
return S[T[x]];
}
// Abstract parametric spec
const unsigned absUsize;
typedef absUniv 0..absUsize-1
bool absS[absUsize];
void add(absUniv x) {
absS[x] := true;
}
...
// Assumption R: Usize = absUsize
&& T injective
// Parametric gluing relation
\forall univ x:
S[T[x]] = absS[x]
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. (a) A parametric machine program Q[Usize, T ] representing a parametric set
machine, and (b) abstract parametric specification B[absUsize] and parametric gluing
predicate.
– (init) Let opinit() = q0 and op
′
init() = q
′
0. Then we require that (q
′
0, q0) ∈ ρ.
Thus, after the machines are initialized, their states must be ρ-related.
– (sim) Let p ∈ Q, and p′ ∈ Q′, with (p′, p) ∈ ρ. Let n ∈ N , a ∈ In, and suppose
opn(p, a) = (q, b) and op
′
n(p
′, a) = (q′, b′). Then we must have b = b′ and
(q′, q) ∈ ρ.
It is not difficult to see that existence of an adequate gluing invariant is sufficient
for refinement.
When machines are presented in the form of programs, we can use Floyd-
Hoare logic based code-level verification tools (like VCC [7] for C, or GNAT Pro
[2] for Ada Spark), to phrase the refinement conditions as pre/post annotations
and carry out a machine-checked proof of refinement [12]. The basic idea is to
combine both the abstract and concrete programs into a single “combined” pro-
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gram with separate state variables but joint methods that carry out the abstract
and concrete operation one after the other. The gluing relation is specified as a
predicate on the combined state. Fig. 1(b) shows an abstract specification and a
gluing relation, for the set machine program of part (a). The refinement condi-
tions (init) and (sim) are phrased as pre/post annotations on the joint operation
methods, in the expected manner.
2.2 Generative Systems and Parametric Refinement
A generative system is a program G that given an input specification I (in some
space of valid inputs), generates a machine program PI . As an example, one can
think of a set machine generator SetGen, that given a number n of type unsigned
int (representing the universe size), generates a program Pn similar to the one
in Fig. 1(a), which uses the constant n in place of the set size 4, and an array
Tn of size n, which maps each x in [0..n− 1] to (x+ 1) mod n.
For every I, let us say we have an abstract machine (again similar to the
one in Fig. 1(b)) say AI , describing the intended behaviour of the machine PI .
Then the verification problem of interest to us, for the generative system G, is
to show that for each input specification I, PI refines AI . This is illustrated
in Fig. 3(a). We propose a way to address this problem using refinement of
parametric programs, which we describe next.
Parametric Refinement. A parametric program is like a standard program, ex-
cept that it has certain read-only variables which are left uninitialized. These
uninitialized variables act like “parameters” to the program. We denote by P [V ]
a parametric program P with an uninitialized variable V . As such a parametric
program has no useful meaning (since the uninitialized variables may contain
arbitrary values). But if we initialize the variable V with a value v passed to
the program, we get a standard program which we denote by P [v]. Thus P [v]
is obtained from P [V ] by adding the definition V := v to the declaration of V .
By convention we use uppercase names for parameter variables, and lowercase
names for values passed to the program. Instead of a single parameter we allow
a parametric program to have a list of parameters V¯ , and extend our notation
in the expected way for such programs.
Let N be a set of operation names. A parametric machine program of type
N is a parametric program Q[V¯ ] containing a method fn for each operation
n ∈ N . The input/output types of fn may be dependent on and derived from the
parameter values. Given a parameter value v¯ for V¯ , we obtain the program Q[v¯]
which is a machine program. Each method fn now has a concrete input/output
type which we denote by I v¯n and O
v¯
n respectively. Q[v¯] is thus a machine program
of type (N, {I v¯n}n∈N , {Ov¯n}n∈N ), and has a set of states that we denote by Sv¯.
We define the state space of Q[V¯ ], denoted SQ, to be
⋃
v¯ S
v¯.
Fig. 2(a) shows an example parametric machine program Q[Usize, T ], rep-
resenting a parametric version of the set program in Fig. 1(a). Given a value 4
for Usize and a list [1, 2, 3, 0] for T , we get the machine program Q[4, [1, 2, 3, 0]],
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which behaves similar to the one of Fig. 1(a). We note that the input type of
the methods add and elem depend on the value of the parameter Usize.
Given two parametric machine programs Q[V¯ ] and B[U¯ ] of type N , we are
interested in exhibiting a refinement relation between instances of Q[V¯ ] and
B[U¯ ]. Let R be a relation on parameter values u¯ for U¯ and v¯ for V¯ , given by a
predicate on the variables in U¯ and V¯ . We say that Q[V¯ ] parametrically refines
B[U¯ ] w.r.t. the condition R, if whenever two parameter values u¯ for U¯ and v¯ for
V¯ are such that R(u¯, v¯) holds, then Q[v¯] refines B[u¯].
We propose a way to exhibit such a conditional refinement, using a single
“universal” gluing relation, as follows. Let Q[V¯ ], B[U¯ ], and R be as above. Let pi
be a relation on the state spaces SQ of Q[V¯ ] and SB of B[U¯ ], given by a predicate
on the variables of Q[V¯ ] and B[U¯ ]. We call pi a parametric gluing relation on
Q[V¯ ] and B[U¯ ]. We say pi is adequate, with respect to the condition R, if the
following conditions are satisfied. In the conditions below, we use the standard
Hoare triple notation for total correctness {G} P {H}, to mean that a program
P , when started in a state satisfying predicate G, always terminates in a state
satisfying H. We use the superscript Q or B to differentiate the components
pertaining to the programs Q[V¯ ] and B[U¯ ] respectively.
1. (type) For each n ∈ N : R(u¯, v¯) =⇒ (IQ,v¯n = IB,u¯n ∧OQ,v¯n = OB,u¯n ).
2. (init) {R} initB(); initQ() {pi}.
3. (sim) For each n ∈ N : {R ∧ pi} rB := fBn (a); rQ := fQn (a) {pi ∧ rB = rQ}.
In the program fragments in (init) and (sim) above we assume that the variable
and type declarations are prefixed to the programs.
We can now state the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Let Q[V¯ ] and B[U¯ ] be parametric machine programs of type N .
Let R be a predicate on U¯ and V¯ , and let pi be an adequate parametric gluing
relation for Q[V¯ ] and B[U¯ ] w.r.t. R. Then Q[V¯ ] parametrically refines B[U¯ ]
w.r.t. the condition R.
Proof. Let Q[V¯ ], B[U¯ ], and R be as in statement of the theorem, and let pi be an
adequate gluing relation w.r.t. R. Consider parameter values u¯ and v¯ satisfying
R. By the (type) condition we know that B[u¯] and Q[v¯] are machines of the
same type. Further, pi restricted to Sv¯ × Su¯ is an adequate gluing relation for
the two machines since it can be seen to satisfy the (init) and (sim) conditions
of Sec. 2.1. uunionsq
Consider the parametric machine program Q[Usize, T ] in Fig. 2(a), and the
abstract parametric program in Fig. 2(b), which we call B[absUsize]. Consider
the condition R which requires that absUsize = Usize and T to be injective. Let
pi be the parametric gluing predicate ∀x : unsigned, (x < Usize) =⇒ S[T [x]] =
absS[x]). Then pi can be seen to be adequate w.r.t. the condition R, and thus
Q[Usize, T ] parametrically refines B[absUsize] w.r.t. R.
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Verifying Generative Systems using Parametric Refinement. Returning to our
problem of verifying a generative system, we show a way to solve this problem
using the above framework of conditional parametric refinement. Consider a
generative system G that given an input specification I, generates a machine
program PI , and let AI be the abstract specification for input I. Recall that
our aim is to show that for each I, PI refines AI . Suppose we can associate
a parametric program Q[V ] with G, such that for each I, G can be viewed
as generating the value vI for the parameter V , so that Q[vI ] is behaviourally
equivalent to PI . And similarly a parametric abstract specification B[U ], and a
concrete value uI for each I, such that AI is equivalent to B[uI ]. Further, suppose
we can show that Q[V ] parametrically refines B[U ] with respect to a condition
R on U and V . Then, for each I such that vI and uI satisfy the condition R, we
can conclude that PI refines AI . This is illustrated in Fig. 3. If R is a natural
enough condition that a correctly functioning generator G would satisfy, then
this argument would cover all inputs I.
As a final illustration in our running example, to verify the correctness of
the set machine generator SetGen, we use the parametric programs Q[Usize, T ]
and B[absUsize] to capture the concrete program generated and the abstract
specification respectively. We then show that Q[Usize, T ] parametrically refines
B[absUsize] w.r.t. the condition R, using the gluing predicate pi, as described
above. We note that the actual values generated for the parameters in this case
(recall that these are values for the parameters Usize, absUsize and T ) do indeed
satisfy the conditions required by R, namely that Usize and absUsize be equal,
and T be injective. Thus we can conclude that for each input universe size n,
the machine program Pn refines An, and we are done.
(a) (b) (c)
R
B[U ]
Q[V ]
I
AI
PI
G
I
G
PI
AI
∀I :
AI ≡ B[uI ]
PI ≡ Q[vI ]
∀I s.t.R(uI , vI) :
Fig. 3. Proving correctness of a generative system using parametric refinement. Part
(a) shows the goal, (b) the proof artifacts and obligation, and (c) the guarantee. Dashed
arrows represent refinement, while dashed arrows with R on their tail represent para-
metric refinement w.r.t. R.
3 Intel x86/64 with VMX Support
In this section we give a high-level view of the x86/64 processor platform, on
which the Muen SK runs. We abstract some components of the system to simplify
our model of the processor system that the Muen toolchain generates. For a more
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complete description of the platform we refer the reader to the voluminous but
excellent reference [19].
The lower part of Fig. 4 depicts the processor system and its components.
The CPU components (with the 64-bit general purpose registers, including the
instruction pointer, stack pointer, and control registers, as well as model-specific
registers like the Time Stamp Counter (TSC)) and physical memory components
are standard. The layer above the CPUs shows components like the VMCS
pointer (VMPTR), the VMX-Timer, and extended page table pointer (EPTP),
which are part of the VT-x layer of the Virtual Machine Extension (VMX) mode,
that supports virtualization. The VMPTR component on each CPU points to a
VMCS structure, which is used by the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) (here
the kernel) to control the launching and exiting of guest processes or “subjects.”
The CR3 register (which is technically one of the control registers in the CPU
component) and the EPTP component (set by the active VMCS pointed to by
the VMPTR) control the virtual-to-physical address translation for instructions
that access memory. On the top-most layer we show the kernel code (abstracted
as a program) that runs on each CPU. The kernel code has two components: an
“Init” component that runs on system initialization, and a “Handler” component
that handles VM exits due to interrupts.
We are interested in the VMX mode operation of this processor, in which the
kernel essentially runs as a VMM, and subjects run as guest software on Virtual
Machines (VMs) provided by the VMM. Subjects could be bare-metal applica-
tion programs, or a guest operating system (called a VM-subject in Muen). A
VM is specified using a VM Control Structure (VMCS), which stores informa-
tion about the guest processor state including the IP, SP, and the CR3 control
register values. It also stores values that control the execution of a subject,
like the VMX-timer which sets the time slice for the subject to run before the
timer causes it to exit the VM, and the extended page table pointer (EPTP)
which translates guest physical addresses to actual physical addresses. It also
contains the processor state of the host (the kernel). To launch a subject in a
VM, the kernel sets the VMPTR to point to one of the VMCSs (from an array
of VMCSs shown in the figure) using the VMPTRLD instruction, and then calls
VMLAUNCH. The launch instruction can be thought of as setting the Timer,
CR3, and EPTP components in the VT-x layer, from the VMCS fields. A subject
is caused to exit its VM and return control to the kernel (called a VM exit), by
certain events like VMX-timer expiry, page table exceptions, and interrupts.
We would like to view such a processor system as a machine of the type de-
scribed in Sec. 2.1. The state of the machine is the contents of all its components.
The main operations here are as follows.
1. Init : The init code of the kernel is executed on each of the processors, starting
with CPU0 which we consider to be the bootstrap processor (BSP).
2. Execute: This operation takes a CPU id and executes the next instruction
pointed to by the IP on that CPU. The instruction could be one that does
not access memory, like an instruction that adds the contents of one register
into another, which only reads and updates the register state on that CPU.
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Or it could be an instruction that accesses memory, like moving a value in a
register R to a memory address a. The address a will be translated via the
page tables pointed to by the CR3 and EPTP components, successively, to
obtain an address in physical memory which will then be updated with the
contents of register R. Some instructions may cause an exception (like an
illegal memory access), in which case we assume the exception handler runs
as part of this operation.
3. Event : We consider three kinds of events (or interrupts). One is the timer
tick event on a CPU. This causes the Time-Stamp Counter (TSC) on the
CPU to increment, and also decrements the VMX-Timer associated with
the active VM. If the VMX-Timer becomes 0, it causes a VM exit, which
is then processed by the corresponding handler. Other events include those
generated by a VMCALL instruction, and external interrupts. Both these
cause a VM exit. The cause of all VM exits is stored in the subject’s VMCS,
which the handler checks and takes appropriate action for.
CPU1 CPU2 CPU3
Ker1 Ker2 Ker3
PT Memory
Timer
VMPTRVMPTR
Timer
VMPTR
Timer Timer EPTP
CR3CR3CR3CR3
EPTPEPTPEPTP
VMCS
Policy
System
Gen
Muen
CPU0
Ker0
VMPTR
Handler
InitInit
Handler Handler
Init
Handler
Init
Fig. 4. Components of an x86/64bit Processor System with VMX Support. Shaded
portions are generated by Muen.
4 Policy Input Specification
The input specification to Muen is an XML file called a policy. It specifies details
of the host processor, subjects to be run, and a precise schedule of execution on
each CPU of the host processor system. Details of the host processor include the
number of CPUs, the frequency of the processor, and the available host physical
memory regions. It also specifies for each device (like a keyboard) the IO Port
numbers, the IRQ number, the vector number, and finally the subject to which
the interrupt should be directed.
The policy specifies a set of named subjects, and, for each subject, the size and
starting addresses of the components in its virtual memory. These components
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include the raw binary image of the subject, as well as possible shared memory
“channels” it may have declared. A channel is a memory component that can
be shared between two or more subjects. The policy specifies the size of each
channel, and each subject that uses the channel specifies the location of the
channel in its virtual address space, along with read/write permissions to the
channel. Fig. 5 depicts a channel Chan shared by subjects Sub0 (with write
permission) and Sub1 (with read permission).
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    
    
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

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





Virt Mem
Sub0
Chan (W)
Virt Mem
Sub1
Chan (R)
Channel Mem
Fig. 5. A memory channel shared by two subjects
The schedule is a sequence of major frames, that are repeated in a cyclical
fashion. Each major frame specifies a schedule of execution for each CPU, for
a common length of time. Time is measured in terms of ticks, a unit of time
specified in the policy. A major frame specifies for each CPU a sequence of
minor frames. Each minor frame specifies a length in ticks, and the subject to
run in this frame. A subject can be assigned to only one CPU in the schedule. An
example scheduling policy in XML is shown in Fig. 6(a), while Fig. 6(b) shows
the same schedule viewed as a clock. Each CPU is associated with one track in
the clock. The shaded portion depicts the passage of time (the tick count) on
each CPU.
Ticks are assumed to occur independently on each CPU, and can result in
a drift between the times on different CPUs. The scheduling policy requires
that before beginning a new frame, all CPUs must complete the previous major
frame. The end of a major frame is thus a synchronization point for the CPUs.
5 Muen Kernel Generator
Given a policy C, the Muen system generator [6] generates the components
of a processor system SC , which is meant to run according to the specified
schedule. This is depicted in Fig. 4, where the Muen toolchain generates the
shaded components of the processor system, like the initial memory contents,
page tables, and kernel code. We describe these components in more detail below.
The Muen toolchain first generates a layout of the memory components of
all the subjects, in physical memory. The contents of these components (like the
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<scheduling tick_rate="10000">
<major_frame>
<cpu id="0">
<minor_fr sub_id="1" ticks="40"/>
<minor_fr sub_id="2" ticks="40"/>
</cpu>
<cpu id="1">
<minor_fr sub_id="3" ticks="80"/>
</cpu>
</major_frame>
<major_frame>
<cpu id="0">
<minor_fr sub_id="1" ticks="80"/>
<minor_fr sub_id="2" ticks="40"/>
</cpu>
<cpu id="1">
<minor_fr sub_id="4" ticks="60"/>
<minor_fr sub_id="3" ticks="60"/>
</cpu>
</major_frame>
</scheduling>
CPU0 CPU1
TSC0
TSC1
CMSC
Maj 0
CurrMajFr
CurrM
inFr0
Cu
rrM
in
Fr
1
Maj 1
Sub2
Sub2
CPU1
CPU0
Sub3
Sub3
Sub1
Sub4
Sub1
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6. (a) An Example schedule, (b) it’s clock view, and (c) it’s implementation in
the Muen kernel.
binary file for the binary component, and the zeroed-out contents of the memory
channels) are filled into an image that will be loaded into physical memory before
execution begins. Based on this layout, the toolchain then generates the page
tables for each subject so that when the subject is running and its page table
is loaded in the CR3/EPTP registers, the virtual addresses will be correctly
mapped to the physical locations.
The Muen toolchain then generates a kernel for each CPU, to orchestrate
the execution of the subjects according to the specified schedule on that CPU.
The kernel is actually a template of code written in Spark Ada, and the Muen
toolchain generates the constants for this template based on the given policy.
The kernel uses data structures like subject-specs to store details like the page
table address and VMCS address for each subject, and subject-descriptors to
store the state of general purpose registers for a subject. To implement schedul-
ing, the kernel uses the scheduling-plans structure which is a multidimensional
array representing the schedule for each CPU. The structure vector -routing is
generated by the toolchain to represent the table which maps an interrupt vector
to the corresponding destination subject and the destination vector to be sent to
the destination subject. The kernel also uses a data structure called global -events
for each subject to save pending interrupts when the destination subject is not
active. These structures and variables are shown in Fig. 7.
The kernel knows the number of ticks elapsed on each CPU from the TSC
register. It uses a shared variable called CMSC (“Current Major Start Cycle”)
to keep track of the start of the current major frame. CMSC is initialized to
the value of the TSC on the BSP, at the time the schedule begins. Thereafter it
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Fig. 7. Components of the generated kernel
is advanced in a fixed periodic manner, based on the specified length of major
frames, whenever a major frame is completed. This is depicted in Fig. 6(c).
We now explain the specific Init and Handler parts of the kernel. In the
initialization phase the kernel sets up the VMCS for each subject. For this the
Init routine reads the subject-specs structure generated by Muen, to fill in fields
like the page table addresses and IP and SP register values, in each subject’s
VMCS. The kernel on each CPU finally sets the VMX Timer value in the VMCS
for the subject that begins the schedule, loads its VMCS address in the VMPTR,
and does a VMLAUNCH.
The handler part of the kernel is invoked whenever there is a VM exit. If
the exit is due to a VMX Timer expiry, the handler checks whether it is at the
end of the major frame by looking at scheduling-plans. If it is not at the end
of a major frame, it just increments the current minor frame. If it is at the
end of a major frame, and not all CPUs have reached the end of the current
major frame, the current CPU waits in a sense-reversal barrier [16]. When all
other CPUs reach the end of the current major frame, they cross the barrier and
the frame pointers are updated by the BSP. The VMX Timer for the subject
to be scheduled next is set to the time remaining in the current minor frame,
calculated using the fact that (TSC - CMSC) time has already elapsed. The
kernel then does a VMLAUNCH for the subject.
If the exit is due to an external interrupt with some vector v, the VM exit
handler finds out the destination subject and the destination vector correspond-
ing to v from vector -routing . Then the handler sets the bit corresponding to
the destination vector in global -events for the destination subject. Whenever
the destination subject is ready to handle the interrupt, the VM exit handler
of the kernel injects the pending interrupt and clears the entry for it in the
global -events structure.
In this work we focus on Ver. 0.7 of Muen. The Muen tool chain is imple-
mented in Ada and C, and comprises about 41K lines of code (LoC). The kernel
template (in Spark Ada) is about 3K LoC.
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6 Proof Overview
Given a policy C, let SC denote the processor system generated by Muen. Let
TC denote an abstract machine spec for the system SC (we describe TC in the
next section). Our aim is to show that for each valid policy C, SC refines TC .
We use the parametric refinement technique of Sec. 2 to verify the functional
correctness of the Muen system. Fig. 8 shows how we achieve this. We first
define a parametric program Q[V¯ ] that models the generic system generated by
Muen, so that for a given policy C, if v¯C corresponds to the parameter values
generated by Muen, then SC and Q[v¯C ] are behaviourally equivalent. In a similar
way we define the abstract parametric program B[U¯ ], so that with appropriate
parameters u¯C , B[u¯C ] captures the abstract spec TC . Next we show that Q[V¯ ]
parametrically refines B[U¯ ] w.r.t. a condition R. Fig. 8 shows the proof artifacts
and obligations. Finally, for a given policy C, we check that the parameter values
u¯C and v¯C satisfy the condition R.
In the next few sections we follow this outline to define the components B[U¯ ]
and Q[V¯ ], the parametric refinement between Q[V¯ ] and B[U¯ ], and finally the
checking of the condition R for given policy configurations.
R
B[U¯ ]
Q[V¯ ]
C
SC ≡ Q[v¯C ]
Muen
TC ≡ B[u¯C ]
Fig. 8. Muen correctness proof
7 Abstract Specification
We describe an abstract specification TC that implements in a simple way the
intended behaviour of the system specified by a policy C. In TC each subject s
is run on a separate, dedicated, single-CPU processor system Ms. The system
Ms has its own CPU with registers, and 2
64 bytes of physical memory VMem.
For each subject s we have a similar sized array called perms which gives the
permissions (read/write/exec/invalid) for each byte in its virtual address space.
The policy maps each subject to a CPU of the concrete machine on which it is
meant to run. To model this we use a set of logical CPUs (corresponding to the
number of CPUs specified in the policy), and we associate with each logical CPU,
the (disjoint) group of subjects mapped to that CPU. Fig. 9 shows a schematic
representation of TC .
To model shared memory components like channels, we use a separate mem-
ory array chmem, as depicted in Fig. 5. We assume a partial function cmaps
which maps the address space of subject s to the channel memory. For any ac-
cess to memory, it is first checked whether that location is in a channel using
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Fig. 9. Schematic diagram of the abstract spcecification TC
another Boolean function called chs, and if so, the content is updated/fetched
from the address in chmem given by the cmaps function.
We have used an array of bit-vectors (one for each subject) called pending-events
to implement interrupt handling. When bit i of the bit vector for a subject s is
set, it represents that the interrupt vector i is pending and has to be handled
by subject s.
There is no kernel in this system, but a supervisor whose job is to process
events directed to a logical CPU or subject, and to enable and disable subjects
based on the scheduling policy and the current “time”. Towards this end it
maintains a flag enableds for each subject s, which is set whenever the subject
is enabled to run based on the current time.
To implement the specified schedule, it uses structures scheduling-plans and
subject-specs, similar to the Muen kernel. However it keeps track of time using the
clock-like abstraction depicted in Fig. 6(b), with the per-logical-CPU variables
ticks (counts each tick event modulo the total schedule cycle length), minticks
(reset at the end of every major frame), idealmajfp (ideal major frame pointer),
minorfp (minor frame pointer), and idealcycles (cycle counter). It also uses a
global major frame pointer called majorfp, and a global cycle counter cycles.
We use two kinds of pointers here – ideal and global. The values of idealcycles
and ticks together tell us the absolute time (number of ticks elapsed) on each
logical CPU, and idealmajfp tells us the major frame based on this time. The
global pointers however are constrained by having to synchronize on the major
frame boundaries, and are updated only when every CPU has completed the
16 I. Haque et al.
major frame. We say a CPU is enabled if the global and ideal values of cycles
match for the CPU, and the global and ideal values of majorfp match.
In the init operation the supervisor initializes the processor systems Ms,
permissions array perms, the channel memory chmem, and also the schedule-
related variables, based on the policy. The execute operation, given a logical CPU
id, executes the next instruction on the subject machine currently active for that
logical CPU id. If the CPU is not enabled, the operation is defined to be a no-op.
An execute operation does not affect the state of other subject processors, except
possibly via the shared memory chmem. If the instruction accesses an invalid
memory address, the system is assumed to shut down in an error state. Finally,
for the event operation, which is a tick/interrupt event directed to a logical CPU
or subject, the supervisor updates the scheduling state, or pending event array,
appropriately.
To represent the system TC concretely, we use an Ada program which we
call AC . AC is a programmatic realization of TC , with processor registers repre-
sented as 64-bit numeric variables, and memory as byte arrays of size 264. The
operations init , execute, and event are implemented as methods that implement
the operations as described above.
Finally, we obtain a parametric program B[U¯ ] from AC , by parameterizing
it as illustrated in Sec. 2. Thus we declare constants like MAXSub, MAXCPU,
MAXMajfr, and MAXMinfr to represent the universe of parameter values we
allow. We then declare parameter variables of these size types, like ANSubs
(for “Abstract Number of Subjects”) of type 1..MAXSub, which will act as
parameters to be initialized later. We call the list of parameters U¯ . We then
declare other variables and corresponding arrays of these sizes (e.g. the array of
per-subject CPUs will have size ANSubs).
By construction, it is evident that if we use the values u¯C for the respective
parameters in U¯ , we will get a machine program B[u¯C ] which is equivalent in
behaviour to AC .
8 Muen System as a Parametric Program
We now describe how we model the system generated by Muen as a parametric
program. Let C be a given policy. To begin with we define a machine program
PC that represents the processor system SC generated by Muen. This is done
similar to the abstract specificationAC in Sec. 7, except that we now have a single
physical memory array which we call PMem. Further, since the processor system
SC makes use of the VT-x components, we need to model these components in PC
as well. To begin with we represent each page table, represented by an identifier
ptab, as a 264 size array PT ptab of 64-bit numbers, with the translation ptab(a) of
an address a being modelled as PT ptab [a]. We model each VMCS as a structure
vmcs with fields as defined in [19]. We use per-CPU variables vmptr and eptp
that could contain a VMCS identifier or a page table identifier respectively.
We also implement instructions like VMRITE and VMPTRLD as method calls
which read/update these program variables and structures. We also include all
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the kernel structures described in Sec. 5 (like subject-specs and scheduling-plans)
as global structures in PC . For each subject s, subject-specs contains a page table
id which we call ptabs.
The operations init , execute, and event are implemented as method calls,
similar to the abstract spec. The init code comes from the Init component of
the kernel (see Sec. 5). We also initialize the physical memory PMem with the
image produced by the Muen toolchain. In the execute method, memory accesses
are translated via the active page table to access the physical memory PMem.
The implementation of the event operation comes from the Handler part of
the kernel code (in particular for handling VM exits due to timer expiry and
interrupts).
Finally, we move from PC to a parametric program Q[V¯ ]. This is done in a
similar way as in Sec. 2 and 7. Apart from the constants like MAXSub, we use
the parameters NSubs, NCPUs, scheduling-plans, subject-specs, vector -routing ,
PMem, and PT . We refer to this list of parameters as V¯ , and refer to the
resulting parametric program as Q[V¯ ]. Once again, for an appropriate list of
values v¯C corresponding to a given policy C, we believe that Q[v¯C ] is equivalent
to PC , which in turn is equivalent to SC .
9 Parametric Refinement Proof
We now show that the parametric version of the Muen system Q[V¯ ] conditionally
refines the parametric abstract spec B[U¯ ]. From Sec. 2.2, this requires us to
identify the condition R, and find a gluing relation pi on the state of parametric
programs Q and B such that the refinement conditions (type), (init), and (sim)
are satisfied.
We use a condition R whose key conjuncts are the following conditions:
– R1: The page tables ptabs associated with a subject s must be injective in
that no two virtual addresses, within a subject or across subjects, may be
mapped to the same physical address, unless they are specified to be part
of a shared memory component. More precisely, for each s, s′, and addresses
a ∈ VMems, a′ ∈ VMems′ , we have:
1. (chs(a) ∧ chs′(a′) ∧ cmaps(a) = cmaps′(a′))
=⇒ ptabs(a) = ptabs′(a′);
2. [s 6= s′∧¬(chs(a) ∧ chs′(a′) ∧ cmaps(a) = cmaps′(a′))] =⇒ ptabs(a) 6=
ptabs′(a
′); and
3. [a 6= a′∧¬(chs(a) ∧ chs′(a′) ∧ cmaps(a) = cmaps′(a′))] =⇒ ptabs(a) 6=
ptabs′(a
′).
– R2: For each subject s, the permissions (rd/wr/ex/present) associated with
an address a should match with the permissions for a in ptabs.
– R3: For each subject s, no invalid virtual address is mapped to a physical
address by page table ptabs.
– R4: For each valid address a in a subject s the initial contents of a in VMems
should match with that of ptabs(a) in the physical memory PMem.
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– R5: The values of the parameters (like NSubs, subject-specs, scheduling-plans
and IOBitmap) in the concrete should match with those in the abstract.
The gluing relation pi has the following key conjuncts:
1. The CPU register contents of each subject in the abstract match with the
register contents of the CPU on which the subject is active, if the subject is
enabled, and with the subject descriptor, otherwise.
2. For each subject s, and valid address a in its virtual address space, the
contents of VMems(a) and PMem(ptabs(a)) should match.
3. The value (TSC−CMSC) on each CPU in the concrete, should match with
how much the ideal clock for the subject’s logical CPU is ahead of the be-
ginning of the current major frame in the abstract.
4. The major frame pointer in the abstract and concrete should coincide, and
the minor frame pointers should agree for enabled CPUs.
5. On every enabled CPU, the sum of the VMX Timer and minticks should
equal the deadline of the current minor frame on that CPU.
6. A CPU is waiting in a barrier in the concrete whenever the CPU is disabled
in the abstract and vice-versa.
7. The contents of the abstract and concrete pending event tables should agree.
We carry out the adequacy check for pi, described in Sec. 2.2, by constructing
a “combined” version of Q and B that has the disjoint union of their state
variables, as well as a joint version of their operations, and phrase the adequacy
conditions as pre/post conditions on the joint operations. In particular, for the
(init) condition we need to show that assuming the condition R holds on the
parameters, if we carry out the joint init operation, then the resulting state
satisfies the gluing relation pi. To check the (sim) condition for an operation n,
we assume a joint state in which the gluing relation pi holds, and then show
that the state resulting after performing the joint implementation of n, satisfies
pi. Once again this is done assuming that the parameters satisfy the condition
R. We carry out these checks using the Spark Ada tool [2] which given an Ada
program annotated with pre/post assertions, generates verification conditions
and checks them using provers Z3 [28], CVC4 [3], and Alt-Ergo [8].
We faced several challenges in carrying out this proof to completion. A basic
requirement of the gluing relation pi is that the abstract and physical memory
contents coincide via the page table map for each subject. After a write instruc-
tion, we need to argue that this property continues to hold. However, even if
one were to reason about a given concrete page table, the prover would never
be able to handle this due to the sheer size of the page table. The key observa-
tion we needed was that the actual mapping of the page table was irrelevant:
all one needs is that the mapping be injective as in condition R1. With this
assumption the proof goes through easily. A second challenge was proving the
correctness of the way the kernel handles the tick event. This is a complex task
that the kernel carries out, requiring 8 subcases to break up the reasoning into
manageable subgoals for both the engineer and the prover. The presence of the
barrier synchronization before the beginning of a new major frame, adds to the
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complexity. The use of auxiliary variables (like an array of last CPUs), and the
case-split helped us to carry out this proof successfully.
Finally, modelling the interrupt handling system, including injection of in-
terrupts in a virtualized setting, was also a complex task. Here too we had to
split the proof of the correctness of interrupt event into multiple subcases (5 in
this case).
Table 1 shows details of our proof effort in terms of lines of code (LoC)
and lines of annotations (LoA) in the combined proof artifact. In the com-
bined artifact the LoC count includes comments and repetition of code due
to case-splits. The whole proof effort took us an estimated 3-4 person-years. All
proof artifacts used in this project are available at https://bitbucket.org/
muenverification/.
B[U¯ ] Q[V¯ ] Combined
LoC LoA LoC LoA LoC LoA
793 0 1,914 0 13,970 6,214
Table 1. Proof artifact sizes
10 Checking Condition R
We now describe how to efficiently check that for a given policy C, the parameters
generated by Muen and those of the abstract specification, satisfy the condition
R. Let Ns be the number of subjects. Let Nv be the maximum size of the virtual
address space, and Nu the actual used space which is the total size of the virtual
memory components of a subject, for a subject. Nv is typically of the order 2
48
bytes (approx 256TB) while Nu is of the order of 1.5GB. Let P denote the size
of a paging structure in bytes, which is of the order of 500K. A naive way to
check the conditions R1 (injectivity), R2 (permission-checking), R3 (validity),
and R4 (content-matching), would be to use a bit array for physical memory
and iterate over all virtual addresses to check these conditions. However, this
runs in time proportional to Nv, and such an algorithm would take days to run.
In contrast, we give a way to check these properties in time proportional to Nu
for each subject. These algorithms run in a few seconds.
To check these properties efficiently we exploit the following facts
– A policy specifies memory in terms of memory components which are blocks
of contiguous pages.
– Muen generates an intermediate representation of physical memory (called
the “B-policy”) which contains the list of all memory components which
have to be placed in the physical memory. We call this list PMemCompo-
nents. Each physical memory component is specified with a name called
“physical name”, size, and the physical address where it has to be placed in
20 I. Haque et al.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to check overlap of physical memory components
1: for all A, B in PMemComponents do
2: if A.PA ≤ B.PA then
3: if A.PA + A.Size ≥ B.PA then
4: Output(“Illegal sharing detected.”);
5: end if
6: end if
7: end for
the physical memory. The B-policy also contains the list of virtual memory
components for each subject which actually are mapped to physical mem-
ory components. The list of virtual memory components for a subject s is
denoted by VMemComponents(s). With each virtual memory component in
a subject, its name called “logical name”, logical address which is the ad-
dress in the subject’s virtual memory, the permissions of the subject, and
the physical name of the physical memory component to which it is mapped
to are specified.
– The sum of size of all the memory components is usually much less than the
physical address space i.e. Nu is small in comparison to Nv.
Injectivity-check R1 Checking the injectivity property of the page tables naively
will require us to check for all pairs of distinct logical addresses possibly in two
different subjects’ address spaces whether they are mapped to the same physical
address via the corresponding page tables. The running time of this naive check
will be proportional to Nv where Nv is approximately 256T.
Since the memory components are blocks of contiguous pages and contiguous
frames in virtual and physical address space respectively, checking the injectiv-
ity property reduces to checking whether any two memory components across
subjects overlap (actually coincide) in physical memory. We first check that the
memory components in PMemComponents have been laid out disjointly in the
physical memory layout given in the B-policy, by checking for overlap. Next we
check whether the physical memory components corresponding to any pair of
virtual memory components possibly from different subjects are overlapping. If
such an overlap is found, to flag it as an illegal sharing we also need to check
whether one of them is not specified as a channel in the original policy and one
of them is writable. We check that one of them is writable because Muen allows
sharing of read-only components to reduce the physical memory footprint. Fi-
nally we check whether the page tables are generated according to the layout in
the B-policy. For this purpose we translate the virtual address of each page in
every virtual memory component of each subject and check that it matches with
the physical address calculated via the B-policy. This algorithm assumes that
R3 holds (validity-check passes) because we have not checked this property for
invalid addresses (logical addresses outside the memory components) in subjects’
virtual address spaces.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm to check overlap of virtual memory components in
physical memory
1: M = ⋃subject sVMemComponents(s)
2: for all A, B in M do
3: if A.PA ≤ B.PA then
4: if A.PA + A.Size ≥ B.PA then
5: if ¬ (isChannel(A) ∧ isChannel(B)) then
6: if isWritable(A) ∨ isWritable(B) then
7: Output(“Illegal sharing detected.”);
8: end if
9: end if
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
Algorithm 3 Algorithm to check whether page tables are generated according
to B-policy
1: for all s in subjects do
2: for all A in VMemComponents(s) do
3: page.LA = A.LA; // logical address
4: page.PA = A.PA; // physical address
5: while page.LA < A.LA + A.size do
6: if ptabs(page.LA) 6= page.PA then
7: Output(“Address mismatch”);
8: end if
9: page.LA = page.LA + page size;
10: page.PA = page.PA + page size;
11: end while
12: end for
13: end for
The algorithm to check the overlapping of two physical memory components
in the physical memory layout is shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm to check
the overlapping of physical memory components corresponding to any two virtual
memory components is shown in Algorithm 2. Finally the algorithm to check
whether page tables are generated according to the layout in the B-policy is
shown in Algorithm 3. A.LA and A.PA denote the logical address of the memory
component A and the physical address corresponding to the logical address of the
memory component A respectively. A.Size is the size of the memory component
A as given in the B-policy. In Algorithm 3 p.LA and p.PA denote the logical and
physical address of a page p respectively as mentioned in the B-policy.
Permission-check R2 Again a naive algorithm to check R2 will check permission
for each page in the corresponding paging structure for each subject and match
it with the permission given in the policy. The running time of this algorithm
will be of the order NsNv. To check R2 efficiently, for each virtual memory
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component in every subject we check that the permission of the pages in the
virtual memory component are set according to the permissions mentioned in
the B-policy. Again this check is dependent on the validity-check as we do not
check the permissions for invalid addresses.
Validity-check R3 To check that only valid addresses are mapped by the page
tables, a naive way will be to translate each virtual address in each subject
and check that only for valid virtual addresses present bit is set in the paging
structures. The running time of this algorithm will be proportional to Nv which
is huge and it will take days to run.
Muen generates a file per subject to store the page tables based on the B-
policy. Paging structures for a subject (PT, PD, PDPT and PML4) are stored
in this file as a contiguous sequence of 64-bit words. In this file, in the beginning
the entries of the PML4 paging structure are stored which are followed by the
entries of the PDPT paging structures. Then the entries of the PDPT paging
structures are followed by all the entries of the PD paging structures and finally
the entries of the PT paging structures are stored.
To check R3 efficiently, we observe that the translation of a valid virtual
address makes use of certain entries of the paging structures in the file containing
the paging structures. The present-bits in only these entries should be set, and all
others should be unset. To check this we use arrays PTBitArrays of bits, one for
each 64-bit entry in the file containing the paging structures for the subject s. We
translate each valid virtual address, and set the bits in the array PTBitArrays
that correspond to each paging structure entry accessed in the translation. After
translating all valid addresses of the subject, we check that there is no entry
in the paging structure with the present-bit set but associated array bit unset.
This is shown in Algorithm 4. In Algorithm 4 PTFiles is the file containing
paging structures for subject s. The function Entries(PTFiles) returns the set
of entries available in the file PTFiles. The function TestPresentBit(i) checks
whether present bit is set in the entry i. We note that this algorithm runs in
time O(Nu + P ) for each subject.
Content-matching R4 and Structure-matching R5 Condition R4 (initial memory
contents) is straightforward to check. We simply compare the content of the
image generated by Muen with each individual component’s content (which is a
specified file or “fill” element) byte by byte. Similarly, condition R5 is checked by
algorithmically generating the abstract parameter data structures and ensuring
that the Muen generated ones conform to them.
Results. We implemented our algorithms above in C and Ada, using the Libxml2
library to process policy files, and a Linux utility xxd to convert the Muen image
and individual files from raw format to hexadecimal format.
We ran our tool on 16 system configs, 9 of which (D7-*,D9-*) were available
as demo configurations from Muen. The remaining configs (DL-*) were config-
ured by us to mimic a Multi-Level Security (MLS) system from [32]. Details
of representative configs are shown in Table 2. For each configuration the table
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Algorithm 4 Validity checking algorithm
1: Create a Boolean array PTBitArrays for each subject s
2: for all s in subjects do
3: for all A in VMemComponents(s) do
4: //Marking the bits in PTBitArrays corresponding to the entries used for
translation of valid virtual addresses
5: for all pages p in A do
6: setBit(PTBitArrays, PML4 offset)
7: setBit(PTBitArrays, PDPTE offset)
8: setBit(PTBitArrays, PDE offset)
9: setBit(PTBitArrays, PTE offset)
10: end for
11: end for
12: //Checking present bit is set in any other entries
13: for all i in Entries(PTFiles) do
14: if (TestPresentBit(i) = 1) ∧ (PTBitArrays[i] = 0) then
15: Output(“Invalid Page Table Entry i”)
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
columns show the number of subjects, number of CPUs, the size of physical
memory needed on the processor, the ISO image size generated by the Muen
toolchain, the time taken by our condition checking tool, and finally whether
the check passed or not.
We used the 3 configs D9-* (from Ver. 0.9 of Muen) as seeded faults to test
our tool. Ver. 0.9 of Muen generates implicit shared memory components, and
this undeclared sharing was correctly flagged by our tool.
The average running time on a configuration was 5.6s. The experiments were
carried out on an Intel Core i5 machine with 4GB RAM running Ubuntu 16.04.
System Sub CPU PMem Image Time Check
(MB) (MB) (s) Passed
D7 Bochs 8 4 527.4 13.8 3.7 X
DL conf1 8 4 506.5 12.9 3.7 X
DL conf2 9 4 1552.7 15.1 6.8 X
DL conf3 12 4 1050.1 23.3 6.7 X
DL conf4 16 4 1571.4 15.1 9.2 X
D9 Bochs 10 2 532.9 16.2 4.9 7
D9 vtd 16 4 1057.8 18.4 5.9 7
D9 IntelNuc 10 2 567.0 16.2 5.5 7
Table 2. Checking condition R on different configs
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11 Basic Security Properties
While we believe that the property we have proved for Muen in this paper
(namely conformance to an abstract specification via a refinement proof) is the
canonical security property needed of a separation kernel, security standards
often require some specific basic security properties to be satisfied. We discuss
below how some of these properties mentioned in [11,15] follow from the verifi-
cation exercise we have carried out for Muen.
Let us consider a system SC generated by Muen, and the abstract specifica-
tion TC , for a given policy C. Let us further assume that the generated parame-
ters satisfy the condition check of Step 2. Then we know that every (error-free)
sequence of operations in the concrete system SC can be simulated, via the glu-
ing relation ρ built on injective page tables, by the abstract system TC . We now
argue that the system SC must satisfy the specific security properties below.
No exfiltration This property states that the execution of a subject does
not influence the state of another subject. In our setting, we take this to mean
that a write to a memory address a by a subject s does not affect the memory
contents of subject s′, assuming address a is not part of a declared memory
channel between s and s′. Let us consider a sequence of operations in Sc leading
to state Si where subject s performs an exfiltrating write to address a. Now
by our refinement proof, the abstract system TC must be able to simulate the
same initial sequence of operations and reach a state Ti which is glued to Si via
the gluing relation ρ, which in turn is based on page table maps satisfying the
injective property R1. Now when s makes an exfiltrating write to address a to
take the concrete state from Si to Si+1, the memory contents of s
′ must change
in going from state Si to Si+1. However when we perform the same write in the
abstract state Ti, the memory contents of s
′ do not change in going from Ti to
Ti+1. It follows that the state Ti+1 cannot be glued via ρ to the concrete state
Si+1. This contradicts the simulation property of our proof. Thus, it follows that
no subject can perform an exfiltrating write. A similar argument holds to show
that s cannot change the other components (like the register contents) of the
state of s′.
No infiltration This property states that an operation by a subject s should
not be influenced by the state of another subject s′. More precisely, suppose we
have two concrete states S1 and S2 of SC in which the state of subject s is
identical. In our setting this means that S1 and S2 are glued, respectively, to
abstract states T1 and T2 in which the states of s are identical. Now suppose
subject s performs an operation (say a read of a memory location) in S1 and
S2 to reach S
′
1 and S
′
2 respectively. Then the state of s in S
′
1 and S
′
2 should be
identical. However, this follows from our proof, since by construction the state
of s in T ′1 and T
′
2 obtained by performing the same operation in the abstract
states T1 and T2 respectively, must be identical. Since S
′
1 and S
′
2 must be glued
to T ′1 and T
′
2 respectively, the property follows.
Temporal separation This property states that subjects are executed ac-
cording to the specified schedule, and that while they are inactive their state
does not change. The latter could happen for instance if the register state of the
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previously executing subject was exposed by not restoring the current subject’s
state correctly. Once again this property follows in our setting since every se-
quence of operations by SC must be matched by the abstract specification, and
by construction the abstract specification executes according to the specified
policy and the state of a subject does not change while inactive.
We note that the property of non-bypassability from [11] would require the
above three properties to hold.
Kernel integrity This property states that the kernel state, including its
code and data, is not affected by the operations carried out by a subject. This
property is called the tamper-proof property in [11]. Though this property is not
directly modelled in our setting (note that we model the kernel code and data
as a high-level program that cannot be accessed by subjects), while checking
condition R we also check that the page tables generated by Muen satisfy the
injective property across all memory components, including the kernel compo-
nents, as specified in the B-policy of Muen. This effectively ensures the integrity
of the kernel.
12 Discussion
The validity of the verification proof carried out in this work depends on several
assumptions we have made. Some implicit assumptions we have made include
the fact that processor hardware components like page table translation and
VMX instructions behave the way we have modelled them.
In addition there are several explicit assumptions related to the way we have
modelled the abstract specification of how the SK is expected to behave:
– When scheduling actually begins after the initialization routines, the TSCs
on all CPUs have the same value.
– If any subject performs an illegal instruction (like accessing an invalid mem-
ory address) the system halts in an error state.
– The tick count on the 64-bit TSC counter does not overflow (this is a mild
assumption as it would take years to happen); Similarly we assume that a
minor frame length is never more than 232 ticks as the VMX Timer field is
only 32-bits wide.
If any of these assumptions are violated, the proof will not go through, and in fact
we would have counter-examples to conformance with the abstract specification.
Finally, we show the various components used in our verification in Fig. 10.
Each box represents a automated tool (full boxes) or manual transformation
carried out (dashed boxes). Components that we trust in the proof are unshaded,
while untrusted components are shown shaded.
We would like to mention that the developers of Muen were interested in
adding our condition checking tool to the Muen distribution, as they felt it
would strengthen the checks they carry out during the kernel generation. We
have updated our tool to work on the latest version (v0.9) of Muen, and handed
it over to the developers.
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Fig. 10. Components in Muen verification. Untrusted components are shown shaded
while non-automated (manual) steps are shown with dashed boxes.
13 Related Work
We classify related work based on general OS verification, verification of sepa-
ration kernels, and translation validation based techniques.
Operating System Verification. There has been a great deal of work in formal
verification of operating system kernels in the last few decades. Klein [20] gives
an excellent survey of the work till around 2000. In recent years the most com-
prehensive work on OS verification has been the work on seL4 [21], which gave
a refinement-based proof of the functional correctness of a microkernel using the
Isabelle/HOL theorem prover. They also carry out an impressive verification of
page table translation [35]. The CertiKOS project [14] provides a technique for
proving contextual functional correctness across the implementation stack of a
kernel, and also handles concurrency. Other recent efforts include verification of
a type-safe OS [37], security invariants in ExpressOS [26], and the Hyperkernel
project [29].
While verification of a general purpose OS is a more complex task than ours—
in particular a general kernel has to deal with dynamic creation of processes
while in our setting we have a fixed set of processes and a fixed schedule—the
techniques used there cannot readily reason about generative kernels like Muen.
We would also like to note here that while it is true in such verification one often
needs to reason about parametric components (like a method that computes
based on its parameters), the whole programs themselves are not parametric.
In particular, a standard operating system is not parametric: it begins with a
concrete initial state, unlike a parametric program in which the initial state has
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unitialized parameters. Thus the techniques developed in this paper are needed
to reason about such programs.
Finally, we point out that none of these works address the use of VT-x
virtualization support.
Verification of Separation Kernels. There has been substantial work in formal
verification of separation kernels/hypervisors. seL4 [21] can also be configured as
a separation kernel, and the underlying proof of functional correctness was used
to prove information flow enforcement. Heitmeyer et al [15] proved data sepa-
ration properties using a refinement-based approach for a special-purpose SK
called ED, in an embedded setting. As far as we can make out these systems are
not generative in nature, and either do not use or do not verify hardware virtu-
alization support. Additionally, unlike our work, none of these works (including
OS verification works) are post-facto: they are developed along with verification.
Dam et al [10] verify a prototype SK called PROSPER, proving informa-
tion flow security on the specification and showing a bisimulation between the
specification and the implementation. PROSPER works for a minimal configu-
ration with exactly two subjects, and is not a generative system. The Verisoft
XT project [4] attempted to prove the correctness of Microsoft’s Hyper-V hyper-
visor [23] and Sysgo’s PikeOS, using VCC [7]. While the Hyper-V project was
not completed, the PikeOS memory manager was proved correct in [5]. Sanan
et al [33] propose an approach towards verification of the XtratuM kernel [9] in
Isabelle/HOL, but the verification was not completed.
Translation Validation Techniques. Our verification problem can also be viewed
as translation validation problem, where the Muen generator translates the input
policy specification to an SK system. The two kinds of approaches here aim to
verify the generator code itself (for example the CompCert project [24]) which
can be a challenging task in our much less structured, post-facto setting; or aim
to verify the generated output for each specific instance [30]. Our work can be
viewed as a via-media between these two approaches: we leverage the template-
based nature of the generated system to verify the generator conditionally, and
then check whether the generated parameter values satisfy our assumed condi-
tions.
14 Conclusion
In this work we have proposed a technique to reason about template-based gen-
erative systems, and used it to carry out effective post-facto verification of the
separation property of a complex, generative, virtualization-based separation
kernel. In future work we plan to extend the scope of verification to address
concurrency issues that we presently ignore in this work.
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